In expected utility theory, risk attitudes are modeled entirely in terms of utility. In the rank-dependent theories, a new dimension is added: chance attitude, modeled in terms of nonadditive measures or nonlinear probability transformations that are independent of utility. Most empirical studies of chance attitude assume probabilities given and adopt parametric fitting for estimating the probability transformation. Only a few qualitative conditions have been proposed or tested as yet, usually quasi-concavity or quasi-convexity in the case of given probabilities. This paper presents a general method of studying qualitative properties of chance attitude such as optimism, pessimism, and the ''inverse-S shape'' pattern, both for risk and for uncertainty. These qualitative properties can be characterized by permitting appropriate, relatively simple, violations of the sure-thing principle. In particular, this paper solves a hitherto open problem: the preference Ž . axiomatization of convex ''pessimistic'' or ''uncertainty averse'' nonadditive measures under uncertainty. The axioms of this paper preserve the central feature of rank-dependent theories, i.e. the separation of chance attitude and utility.
INTRODUCTION
UNDER EXPECTED UTILITY, risk attitudes are modeled solely through outcome sensitivity, i.e. curvature of utility. Classical economics thus identifies risk Ž Ž . . aversion with concave utility Arrow 1953 , and the Pratt-Arrow utility index is used as a measure of risk aversion. Dissatisfaction with such an entangling of risk attitude and marginal utility, and empirical paradoxes, have led to a number Ž . of new theories. For risk i.e. given probabilities , rank-dependent utility was Ž . Ž . introduced by Quiggin 1981 . Schmeidler 1989 introduced rank-dependent Ž . utility for uncertainty i.e. no probabilities of events need to be given . The theory was generalized to allow for a different treatment of gains and losses in Ž Ž . cumulative prospect theory Starmer and Sugden 1989 , Luce and Fishburn Ž . Ž .. 1991 , Tversky and Kahneman 1992 In the rank-dependent models, riskruncertainty attitudes consist of two Ž . independent and clearly separate components: a sensitivity towards outcomes, Ž . Ž . modeled through utility, and b sensitivity towards uncertainty chance attitude , Ž . modeled through a nonadditive measure capacity under uncertainty and through a probability transformation under risk. In the context of risk, chance attitude is sometimes called probabilistic risk attitude. Descriptively, chance attitude seems to be as important as utility. Recent work suggests, for instance, Ž Ž . that there is an important role for chance attitude in insurance Viscusi 1995 , Ž .. Ž . Wakker, Thaler, and Tversky 1997 . Selten, Sadrieh, and Abbing 1999 and Ž . Bleichrodt, van Rijn, and Johannesson 1999 suggest that there is more curvature for probability than for moderate monetary outcomes or life-duration outcomes, respectively.
Most studies of chance attitude have considered decision under risk and here Ž . Ž . a host of results is available Appendix A . In particular, Segal 1987 and Wu Ž . and Gonzalez 1996 used special forms of the conditions of this paper to characterize various properties of weighting functions. In most applications, probabilities are not given. Testable preference axiomatizations for uncertainty are therefore warranted.
This paper presents a general method of axiomatizing and testing properties Ž . of nonadditive measures ''capacities'' through observable choice behavior. It demonstrates that several conditions, studied before in the literature and tested in experiments, are special cases of the general method. A unifying framework is thus obtained for the study of capacities. In particular, a preference axiomatiza-Ž . tion of convex pessimistic capacities is presented. Even though convexity is the most-studied property of capacities, a general preference axiomatization has not been known before. As demonstrated in the formal analysis of Sections 3 to 5, Ž . convex capacities naturally follow from the common consequence version of the Allais paradox. That the Allaisᎏrather than the Ellsbergᎏparadox is relevant here is contrary to what has sometimes been thought. This paper is based on three observations. First, decision under risk is the special case of decision under uncertainty where probabilities of events are given. Second, the Allais paradox pertains to uncertainty as well as to risk Ž Ž . Ž MacCrimmon and Larsson 1979, p. 364᎐365 , Tversky and Kahneman 1992, .. Section 1.3 . Third, whereas the Ellsberg paradox exhibits a relative phenomenon, i.e. more pessimism for unknown probabilities than for known proba-Ž . bilities, the Allais paradox exhibits pessimism in an absolute noncomparative sense.
Ž . The axiomatizations of convex capacities known up to now see Section 2 do not disentangle utility from chance attitude and require concave or linear utility. The conditions presented in this paper characterize capacities independently of utility. They thus provide tools for analyzing chance attitude, the new component of risk attitude, while preserving a central feature of rank-dependent utility, namely the separation of chance attitude and outcome sensitivity. For Ž . decision under risk, Abdellaoui 2001 presented an alternative method of nonparametric qualitative tests of probability transformation that are also independent of outcome sensitivity. Abdellaoui's method is more complex than the one presented here but in return gives more powerful results, allowing for quantitative measurements of probability transformation.
The central result of this paper is Theorem 4.1. This theorem describes the general method of analyzing qualitative properties of capacities through simple violations of the sure-thing principle. The paper up to Theorem 4.1 prepares for the general method, and the rest of the paper describes various applications.
Appendix A presents empirical evidence and Appendix B presents formal proofs.
CHOQUET EXPECTED UTILITY AND CONVEX CAPACITIES
This section presents basic concepts of decision under uncertainty, the context assumed in the major part of the paper. S denotes a state space, with elements called states and subsets called e¨ents. S is infinite in Section 5 and can be finite or infinite in the rest of the paper. The outcome set is ‫,ޒ‬ designating money. Ž The set of acts contains all finite-valued functions from S to ‫.ޒ‬ E , 
We assume Choquet expected utility CEU throughout this paper: Ž .
i A function U: ‫ޒ‬ ª ‫ޒ‬ is given, the utility function. Ž .
ii A capacity W is given on S, i.e. W is defined on the collection of subsets Ä 4 where the 's are defined as follows. Take a permutation on 1, . . . , n such
bution of event E to the events yielding better outcomes. If two acts f and g
Ž Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . . are comonotonic f s ) f t and g s -g t for no s, t , then the same partition Ž . E , . . . , E and the same permutation , and therefore also the same decision 1 n Ž Ž . . weights , can be used for f and g Wakker 1989, Section VI.3 .
W is conca¨e if the reversed inequality holds. Convexity can be rewritten as
Is C y D where y denotes set difference , convexity means that for all disjoint events A, H, I,
Ž .
d A, H is nondecreasing in H.
These inequalities correspond to nondecreasing differences of a convex proba-Ž . Ž . bility transformation w, where wh y w h is nondecreasing in h. Convexity of the capacity means that an event receives more decision weight as its associated outcome is ranked lower. Convexity reflects a pessimistic attitude where more attention is paid to unfavorable than to favorable outcomes. Similar observations hold for concavity, with reversed inequalities and an optimism interpretation.
Capacities are usually assumed to be convex in the current literature. Many Ž . papers assume an Anscombe-Aumann 1963 Wu and Gonzalez 1999 . They showed that the conditions are necessary for convex capacities. This paper generalizes their conditions and shows that the resulting conditions are not only necessary, but also sufficient, so that axiomatizations are obtained.
CONVEX CAPACITIES AS A GENERALIZATION OF THE ALLAIS PARADOX
This section demonstrates how convex capacities naturally arise from the Allais paradox, starting with some notational conventions for the figures. 2 In Figure 1 , H, A, and I are three events. One and only one of these events will obtain and it is unknown to a decision maker which event that will be. It is always assumed without further mention that the events partition the universal event in such illustrations of acts. Figure 1a depicts an indifference between a Ž . left act, yielding m i.e., $m if H obtains, m if A obtains, and 0 if I obtains, and a right act interpreted similarly. In Figure 1b , the common outcome 0 at I has been changed into the common outcome m, and a weak preference is depicted. Let me explain why the I branch has been moved from the lowest to the middle position in Figure 1b . For a given gamble, events can be rank-ordered according to the desirability of their associated outcomes. Events are depicted higher as their outcomes are rank-ordered higher. Hence, the I branch has been moved from the lowest to the middle position in Figure 1b . Event H is always associated with Highest outcomes in this paper. For the outcome resulting under event I it is always Irrelevant which gamble is chosen. We will study the change of event A's decision weight induced by the change of event A's ranking position.
Ž .
s As a convention, the left gamble is the Safer one and the Right gamble is " Ž . r more Risky .
" Figure 1 has the structure of the Allais paradox. In the Allais paradox, events H, A, and I have probabilities .10, .01, and .89, respectively, M is five million dollars, and m is one million dollars. For these values, people typically have a strict preference $ in Figure 1a and a reversed strict preference % in Figure  1b , demonstrating that the replacement of the common outcome leads to a stronger preference for the left act in Figure 1b . This change in preference can be ascribed to the certainty effect: In Figure 1b , the left act yields a certain outcome; the absence of risk adds to the preference value of the act. These preferences imply a violation of expected utility because they have been affected Ž . by a change of the common outcomes, thus violating Savage's 1954 sure-thing Ž . principle. After decreasing the payment M five million dollars to a lower amount such that indifference results in Figure 1a , the weak preference in Figure 1b is natural.
If the Allais paradox is not an isolated example but reflects a general principle of decision under uncertainty, then it may be conjectured that the implication in Ä 4 Figure 1 The Allais paradox may be caused by a phenomenon more general than the certainty effect, i.e. it may be caused by a kind of pessimism. Pessimism entails more attention for events as their outcomes are ranked lower. This phenomenon can also explain why event A receives more attention in Figure 1b than in Figure  1a . Under the pessimism interpretation, the implication in Figure 2 becomes reasonable. In Figure 2 , an event L has been added that yields a common outcome lower than all other outcomes. As a notational convention, event L is associated with Lowest outcomes throughout this paper. Event A is ranked lower in Figure 2b than in Figure 2a Example A.2 describes an empirical test of the general condition of Figure 2 . We now proceed with a theoretical analysis of the choices in Figure 2 . It is first demonstrated that convexity of the capacity implies pessimism. Then the reversed implication is explained informally. For the first implication, we substitute Choquet expected utility in Figure 2a :
where the 's, the decision weights, are depicted in Figure 3a . The rank-order-Ž . Ž . ing of events is from left high to right low in Figures 3a and 3b. The same decision weights can be used for both acts in Figure 2a because the acts are comonotonic.
Substitution of Choquet expected utility in Figure 2b , where the acts are also comonotonic, implies
A A where the 's, the decision weights, are depicted in Figure 3b . We rewrite Ž . Figure 2a , for instance if H is empty. In such cases, other solutions must be found, based on convergence arguments that invoke events for which appropriate MG m ) 0 can be found.
THE GENERAL METHOD OF WEAKENING THE SURE-THING PRINCIPLE
This section presents the general method of analyzing capacities in rankdependent theories. The characteristic feature of these theories is the rank dependence of decision weights, leading to special predictions of deviations from expected utility. Hence, our preference conditions are based on that rank dependence. They will all describe special kinds of violations of the sure-thing principle.
Figure 4 presents a general method of comparing the decision weight of an event A in one rank-ordering position to its weight in another rank-ordering Ž . FIGURE 4: X G x . At the question mark a preference is to be substituted. position, by letting an event I with a common outcome ''pass by event A'' in Ž . rank-ordering. The method was described by Wakker 1986, Condition VI.11.1 . The left act in Figure 4a is described by the restriction of an act f for the events
assigning f s to each s in H and L ; it is constant and equal H L to outcome X in event A, and it is constant and equal to outcome c in event I. Ž . The other acts are defined similarly. For the left act in Figure 4a , f s G X G c G Ž . f t for all s g H and t g L. Similar orderings of outcomes hold for other acts. These orderings follow from our convention of depicting events higher as they are rank-ordered higher. The acts in Figure 4a are comonotonic and so are the ones in Figure 4b .
Assume that X ) x. The analysis of Figure 4 in terms of CEU is similar to the analysis of Figure 2 and is described briefly. The CEU difference between the Ž . left and right act in Figure 4b differs from that in Figure 4a which is zero only regarding the contribution of event A, for which the decision weight has changed Ž . from to see Figure 3 . Hence, the following substitutions are possible A A for the question mark in Figure 4b , corresponding to a nonnegative, zero, or nonpositive CEU difference, respectively: Figure 4 thus gives a precise measurement tool for the change of decision weights and thereby, indirectly, for the convexity and concavity of the capacity. Several empirical investigations derived such implications and then tested them, Ž . without studying reversed implications; see Camerer 1989 Segal 1987 , Wu and Gonzalez 1996 . That is, little is available to show that the conditions characterize the properties of probability transformations and capacities and in this sense provide critical tests. Providing such characterizations and explaining the underlying general method of analyzing capacities is the purpose of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 summarizes the discussion for convexity. It is convenient to also consider the case X s x in the preference conditions of this paper. Indifference then always results in Figure 4b , and the preference conditions are vacuously satisfied under CEU. Adding this case therefore does not change the logical force of the preference conditions and, hence, the case is also mentioned in Theorem 4.1. Figure 4a , rather than just . indifference, should imply the same preference in Figure 4b is logically stronger than the conditions used in our theorems but is still necessary. Accordingly, it gives weaker characterization theorems and therefore it has not been used. Similar observations, with preferences reversed, apply to concavity.
CHARACTERIZING VARIOUS FORMS OF CAPACITIES FOR RICH STRUCTURES
In the absence of a rich structure of outcomes and events, there may not exist Ž Ž . . many configurations of the type depicted in Figure 4 Wakker 2001 . In such a case, a requirement of specific preferences in Figure 4b may be too weak to imply the desired properties of the capacity. We therefore add a continuum assumption. As a preparation, the capacity W is sol¨able if, for each pair of . as permitted in Figure 2 characterizes convexity of the capacity. Concavity is characterized by optimism, which requires that the implication in Figure 2 holds with reversed preference U instead of # in Figure 2b , whenever MG m G 0 Ä 4 and H, A, I, L partitions the state space. The condition reflects the optimistic attitude of paying more attention to events as they are rank-ordered higher. Ž .
ii The capacity is conca¨e if and only if # exhibits optimism.
Most papers assume convexity because of its importance in theoretical derivations. However, whereas convexity would predict an underweighting of unlikely events when associated with highest outcomes, experiments suggest the opposite: Such events are overweighted. The phenomenon suggests an ''inverse-S Ž Ž . Ž . shaped'' capacity Fox 1995 , Fox, Rogers, and Tversky 1996 Karni and Safra 1990 , who already discussed inverse-S shapes.
Inverse-S means that the capacity assigns relatively high values to unlikely events and relatively low values to likely events. For risk, the condition entails an inverse-S shaped graph of the probability transformation indeed. The condition implies extremity-oriented behavior, where high decision weights are assigned to the highest and lowest outcomes and low decision weights to the intermediate outcomes. The inverse-S pattern resolves the classical economic paradox of the simultaneous existence of gambling and insurance. Under Ž Ž . . cumulative prospect theory Tversky and Kahneman 1992 , the two phenomena are explained by the same cause: the overestimation of unlikely events.
The inverse-S property is based on the observation that people deviate from expected utility not only because of a general dislike for risk and uncertainty Ž . pessimism etc. , but also because of insensitivity. People are not sufficiently sensitive towards changes in intermediate levels of likelihood and, for instance, do not sufficiently distinguish between a .6 and a .8 level probability. This insensitivity is more pronounced for unknown probabilities than for known probabilities. It causes a sort of regression to the mean. This regression is not an artifact from our statistical analysis but it is a real psychological phenomenon occurring in people's minds, and therefore worthwhile being incorporated into our models of human behavior. Ž . Ž . A first way to model inverse-S was proposed by Bell 1985 and Cohen 1992 , who deviated from expected utility by overweighing extreme outcomes. A second Ž . approach was adopted by Wakker 1995 and Fox Ž . 1995 , who imposed ''subadditivity'' of the capacity for unlikely events and, similarly, subadditivity of the dual capacity. This paper follows a third approach, Ž Ž . . the one most commonly adopted Wu and Gonzalez 1996 , 1998 , 1999 : Concavity is imposed on the unlikely events and convexity on the likely events. Henceforth, such capacities are called ca¨ex. As a preparation, we discuss a technique for imposing conditions on ''intervals'' of events.
Event C is re¨ealed more likely than D, C # D, if there exist outcomes Z ) z Ž . Ž . such that C, Z; S y C, z # D, Z; S y D, z . Under CEU, this relation on the events is a weak order, represented by the capacity. The notation % , ; , U , w x and $ is as usual. For events C U D, C, D denotes the set of events E for
The latter restriction guarantees that all arguments of Ž W that play a role in the decision weights events A j H j I, H j I, A j H, and
. We next apply the preceding results to decision under risk, where preferences Ž . are defined over probability distributions p , x ; . . . ; p , x yielding outcome x 1 1 n n j with probability p , j s 1, . . . , n. Formally, decision under risk can be considered j w x the special case of decision under uncertainty where the state space is 0, 1 , endowed with the uniform distribution P, and acts are indifferent whenever they generate the same probability distribution over outcomes. Rank-dependent utility is the special case of Choquet expected utility where the capacity W on the state space is w ( P for a strictly increasing continuous weighting function w Ž . Ž . Ž Ž .. with w 0 s 0 and w 1 s 1 Wakker 1990 . It is elementarily verified that convexity, concavity, and, similarly, the inverse-S condition, of w are then equivalent to the same conditions of W. Hence, the preference axiomatizations of this section immediately result in corresponding preference axiomatizations for risk, simply by replacing events by their probabilities. For example, w is convex if and only if the implication of Figure 5 holds for all MG m G 0. The other results for uncertainty can similarly be applied to risk.
The preceding discussion of risk may highlight two points. First, uncertainty is important not only in a practical sense, as probabilities are rarely known, but also in a formal sense, because the results for uncertainty immediately imply the corresponding results for risk. Once this point is understood, the extension of the Allais paradox to uncertainty becomes natural, leading to the second point: The Allais paradox reveals a pessimistic attitude that pertains as much to uncertainty as to risk.
ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE PESSIMISM AND THEIR LOGICAL INDEPENDENCE
It has sometimes been thought that the Allais paradox exhibits a phenomenon characteristic of risk and the Ellsberg paradox a phenomenon characteristic of uncertainty. This paper has demonstrated that the Allais paradox reflects pessimism in an ''absolute'' sense, for risk as well as for uncertainty, leading to convex capacities. The Ellsberg paradox suggests that there is more pessimism for unknown probabilities than for risk, i.e. it exhibits pessimism in a relative sense. The next two examples illustrate the difference. Ž . EXAMPLE 6.1 Relative Pessimism Does Not Imply Absolute Pessimism : Assume that an urn contains 100 balls and that x is an unknown number between 0 and 50. The urn contains 50᎐x purple balls, x blue balls, x green Ž . FIGURE 5: MG m G 0 . Pessimism for risk. Ž balls, and 50᎐x red balls. One ball will be drawn at random and its color P, B, . G, or R observed. Assume that the decision maker maximizes expected utility with respect to known probabilities and is more averse to unknown probabilities than to known probabilities.
Let M) 1 be such that the indifference in Figure 6a holds. The left gamble in Figure 6a yields $1 with probability .5, and the right gamble yields M with an unknown probability between 0 and .5. Aversion to unknown probabilities implies that M must be relatively high to obtain the indifference. The prefer-Ž . ence in Figure 6b , violating our pessimism preference condition Figure 2 , seems natural. In Figure 6b , both gambles yield an outcome of at least 1 with a probability of .5 or more. Here, because of aversion to unknown probabilities, event B does not have the impact it had in Figure 6a . 
W P, B, R s W P, G, R s W B, G, R s 1r2, and W P, B, G, R s 1. Because
Ž . of the small capacities of small events, the decision weight d A, H of each event A is increasing in H. W is therefore convex and pessimism holds. However, any bet on a two-color event with unknown probability is preferred to any bet on a two-color event with known probability. The decision maker is pessimistic but prefers unknown probabilities to known probabilities.
Pessimism as defined in this paper can also be formulated as a relative concept, i.e. being more pessimistic than subjective expected utility. Similarly, absolute risk aversion is sometimes formulated as being more risk averse than expected value maximization. There are, however, some drawbacks to a subjective model as a neutrality benchmark. The subjective expected utility maximiza-Ž . FIGURE 6: M) 1 . Relative pessimism but no absolute pessimism. tion is not directly observable because neither is it objectively given, as is expected value maximization, nor can it be directly revealed from choices of the decision maker under consideration. The benchmark should probably be ascribed to another, hypothetical, agent. This other agent may have the same utility function as the decision maker but it is not clear what his subjecti¨e Ž . probabilities should be. Ghirardato and Marinacci 1999 therefore chose multiple levels of neutrality, i.e. all subjective expected utility maximizers. The present paper instead adopts the absolute interpretation of pessimism.
Contrary to the interpersonal comparisons of capacities on the same events to which we alluded above, the Ellsberg paradox concerns an intrapersonal comparison, comparing behavior revealed by one decision maker with respect to Ž . different events hence, directly observable . It suggests that people are more pessimistic for events with unknown probabilities than for events with known Ž . probabilities. Tversky and Wakker 1995, Section 6 considered intrapersonal comparisons of different events regarding two aspects: ''source sensitivity'' and ''source preference.'' The two Ellsberg paradoxes suggest source preference for known probabilities over unknown probabilities, a condition that corresponds Ž Ž . . but is not identical with being more convex Epstein 1999 . In addition, Ž . Tversky and Wakker 1995, Sections 4 and 5 analyzed interpersonal comparisons of chance attitude.
The terms uncertainty aversion and ambiguity aversion have been used in the literature both for the absolute version of pessimism, designating convexity of Ž the capacity or, similarly, upper subadditivity or source preference in Tversky Ž . Ž .. and Wakker 1995 , or nonempty core in Ghirardato and Marinacci 1999 , and for the relative version, designating more pessimism for unknown probabilities Ž Ž . than for known probabilities Epstein 1999 , who used subjective instead of . known probabilities . Which term is most appropriate for which concept is a terminological issue. If uncertainty is taken to comprise both risk and ambiguity, then uncertainty aversion seems to be most suited for the absolute concept and ambiguity aversion for the relative concepts.
Ž . In Schmeidler's 1989 two-stage model, as in the multiple priors model, expected utility is assumed for risk. Then the absolute and relative versions of pessimism ''happen to be'' equivalent, and the two-urn Ellsberg paradox also leads to convex capacities. This equivalence may have given rise to misunderstandings and confusions about the absolute and relative concepts. In general, these concepts must be distinguished. Preference conditions for relative ''subadditivity,'' comparing risk to uncertainty, were analyzed theoretically by Tversky Ž . Ž . and Wakker 1995 and were tested empirically by Tversky and Fox 1995 . The present paper has concentrated on pessimism and other conditions in an absolute sense.
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APPENDIX A: EMPIRICAL DEMONSTRATIONS
The general method of analyzing capacities, explained in Section 4 and used in the theoretical analysis of Section 5, is well suited for empirical investigations. In fact, many conditions tested in the literature are special cases of this general method. Some examples are described next. The empirical evidence presented in this paper concerns only gain-outcomes unless explicitly stated otherwise. Table I .
Because event L is nonempty, this configuration tests the general pessimism condition of Figure  2 but not upper subadditivity of Figure 1 . With Ms $350 and m s $300, 35% of the participants Ž chose the risky gamble in Figure 2a , but 67% chose the risky gamble in Figure 2b significant at the . .05 level . That is, the tendency to choose the risky gamble in Figure 2b was larger, rather than smaller as pessimism requires. This finding provides a violation of pessimism and suggests the dual, Ž . optimism. It illustrates once more that pessimism and, hence, convexity of capacities is not as universal as has often been thought. Figure 5 with h s .1, q s .1, ps .8 and . l s 0 , Ms £.7, and m s £.3. The design was within-subjects. The participants were 124 students from various disciplines. In Figure 5a , 65% chose safe whereas only 46% did so in Figure 5b . Remarkably, this finding constitutes a significant shift from safe to risky, in violation of upper subadditivity and therefore of the certainty effect. Gonzalez 1996 , 1998 . Wakker, Erev, and Weber 1994 reported a negative finding where Lattimore, Baker, and Witte 1992 , Camerer and Ho 1994 , Tversky and Fox 1995 , Fox, Ž . Ž .. Rogers, and Tversky 1996 , Bleichrodt, van Rijn, and Johannesson 1999 . Parameter-free tests, Ž . Ž . confirming inverse-S, are given by Abdellaoui 2000 , Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000 , Gonzalez and Wu Ž . Ž . 1999 , and Wu and Gonzalez 1996 An interesting version of the method of this paper can be found in the often-cited Chew and Ž . Waller 1986 . They used a ''HILO'' design to test special cases of Chew's weighted utility theory. The ''O'' questions of the design will not be discussed here. The ''I,'' ''L,'' and ''H'' questions can be obtained from Figure 5 by assuming l s 0 and replacing the outcome 0 by a general lowest outcome z. Then the L question is Figure 5a and the I question is Figure 5b The substitutions show that the HILO design can be used to test the probability transformation function. Chew and Waller's data contained antecedent preferences instead of indifferences, as explained following Theorem 4.1. The overall risky choices in the L, I, and H questions were 67%, Ž . 56%, and 50%, respectively see Chew and Waller's Table 4 , suggesting pessimism from L to I Ž . Ž . likely gain-events and optimism from I to H unlikely gain-events . These data therefore support an inverse-S probability transformation.
Only a few papers have dealt with loss outcomes. These papers also found the inverse-S shape, Ž Ž . j иии j E of events in this partition. For the decision weight of E j E in this partition, we
To apply equation B.1 , the rank-ordering of E and E must have been specified, as in the Figure 3a and q in Figure 3b ; these are therefore 
In words, it means that E loses decision weight to E if E ''passes by E '' in the rank-ordering.
Ž Ä 4 . partitions, and also equivalent to the condition H, A; I , L for all four-fold partitions. Consider any E , . . . , E ; E , . . . , E means that
Ž w x . Concavity of W is equivalent to E , . . . , E ; E , . . . , E for all E in all partitions, which is
Ž w x . equivalent to the condition H, A; I , L for all four-fold partitions. Take any such partition. 
